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Refereed article 
Back to Basics: The Power Politics behind Sino–
Japanese Identity Politics 
Giulio Pugliese 
Summary 
This article argues that the assertive Chinese and Japanese foreign and security 
stances of the Xi Jinping and Abe Shinzō administrations have resulted in a 
government-led renaissance of their respective identity politics, one qualified by top-
down, adversarial nationalism. Aided by the nation-state’s communication firepower, 
the two governments have instrumentally insisted upon antagonistic discourses — 
with domestic and foreign audiences in mind. This article does not deny the many 
bottom-up sources of Chinese and Japanese nationalism already discovered by 
constructivist scholars, but introduces rather a different perspective on identity 
construction in Japan and China. On the basis of an array of primary sources, this 
article argues that the logic of Sino–Japanese identity politics has been increasingly 
rooted in the neoclassical realism of Sino–Japanese confrontation. Within the 
broader structural picture of great power competition, the Chinese and Japanese elite 
have engaged in a more assertive foreign policy aimed at territorial defense. Central 
governments enjoy leverage in defining the perimeters of discourse-making, and the 
nationalistic Abe and Xi administrations have mobilized public opinion following the 
2012 crisis surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands standoff. 
Keywords: constructivism, neoclassical realism, propaganda, Japan–China,  
Victory Day parade, Abe statement 
Giulio Pugliese is Lecturer in War Studies at King’s College London, and completed 
his Ph.D. work at the University of Cambridge. His research interests include the 
international politics and economics of the Asia-Pacific region, International Relations 
theory, and strategic communications. His Twitter account is @PugliesAsia. 
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Introduction 
In the late summer of 2015 Japan and China celebrated the 70th anniversary of the 
end of the Second World War. They did so, however, in a way that betrayed their 
very current antagonism. These commemorations would have not halted the very 
timid Sino–Japanese political thaw occurring, but China’s display of its newly 
operational artillery — alongside the shifting regional realignments and security 
doctrines — pointed at a less promising picture for the broader East Asian trends. 
Japanese and Chinese claims over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which 
Japan had quietly incorporated 120 years earlier, ran in parallel lines as did their 
mounting rivalry; in tandem, meanwhile, ran also their official pronouncements. 
State-led narratives actively reconstructed their self-righteous position and made 
active use of, or manipulated, foreign endorsements so as to reinforce it. It all looked 
so old, but this was in fact the new landscape in the East Asian region 70 years from 
the end of the Second World War. Only three years earlier the standoff over the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands ushered in the foundational power politics behind Sino–
Japanese mutually antagonistic discourses, wherein the stable Xi and Abe 
governments beat the nationalistic drums with gusto. 
In September 2012 Tokyo and Beijing entered into a heated standoff over the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands — a small, uninhabited archipelago administered by Japan 
and located in the East China Sea. Japan’s decision to nationalize three islands in the 
archipelago sparked what has since become the worst crisis in Sino–Japanese 
relations since the end of the Second World War. China reacted assertively to the 
Noda Yoshihiko government’s ill-managed acquisition of the islands from a private 
Japanese citizen. While the aim was to thwart the populist bid launched by Tokyo 
Governor Ishihara Shintarō, the islands’ nationalization and China’s heavy-handed 
response led to Japan and China becoming entangled in a bilateral power 
game. China immediately sought to challenge Japan’s effective control and force it 
to recognize the existence of a dispute. However Japan’s position was unwavering 
and, under Abe’s leadership, the government beefed up its hard power and security 
partnerships: it made full use of the country’s economic statecraft to more 
confidently deter China’s coercive retaliation. The more Tokyo and Beijing resorted 
to power politics and economic statecraft to soften their counterpart, the more their 
stances hardened and the higher the risks grew of a potentially serious clash 
occurring. In addition, since each side saw the other as vulnerable to public relations 
attacks on both the international and domestic stages then the power game 
necessarily spilled over into the field of government-led strategic communications, 
commonly known as propaganda. 
Thus, the Japanese and Chinese governments hoisted up a set of vivid and simplistic 
images to mobilize the home front against the counterpart. In this context, Japan and 
China’s official 70th anniversary commemorations of the end of the Second World 
War toed earlier state-sanctioned messages, where the counterpart (“them”) figured 
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as the negative mirror image in the formation of their respective identity (“us”). 
Three discursive threads were discernible in these pronouncements. The first painted 
Japan as a benign and peaceful power pitted against an aggressive China, and vice 
versa. The second stressed the revisionist nature of the neighbor as a challenge to the 
international order, while depicting China/Japan as a status quo country that upholds 
it and abides by international norms. The third set of images was variegated. Japan 
highlighted its political modernization as the first Asian country to uphold universal 
values, such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, doing so in order to 
underline the differences to autocratic China, whose economy surpassed Japan’s in 
2010. In lieu of democratic values, Chinese discourses underlined Japanese leaders’ 
historical revisionism as a sign of Japan’s supposed militaristic behavior. Both 
states’ insistence on the above mirror-like characterizations of each other ultimately 
reinforced, through a loop mechanism, their reciprocal antagonism. 
To be sure, at the dawn of the 21st century Japan and China had already come to 
redefine their state identity vis-à-vis the counterpart in new and, often, adversarial 
ways. Christian Wirth (2015), for instance, has demonstrated the Japanese 
conservative elite’s rediscovery of its democratic and West-sympathetic identity in 
direct relation to China’s rise to Asian primacy; a similar understanding, albeit at a 
more diffuse level, has also been advanced by Kai Schulze (2015). But adversarial 
characterizations soaked into Japanese and Chinese official government 
pronouncements only after the onset of the 2012 Senkaku/Diaoyu standoff; in 
addition, the identity chasm widened even further following the consolidation of 
power by the Xi and Abe administrations. This was because political agents actively 
remolded these antagonistic narratives, often in new ways and with clear political 
aims. For instance, both the Noda and Abe administrations insisted on universal 
values — but prized the “international rule of law” over democracy, human rights, 
and the like. They did so in order to underline what they understood as China’s 
coercive behavior, and to corner Beijing among international and domestic 
audiences — because of its abjuration of legal international arbitration over the 
islands through the International Court of Justice. 
Tokyo’s change of the language register to insist on the rule of law hinted at the 
instrumentalist nature of these discourses. In 2013 former Ambassador to Beijing 
Miyamoto Yūji, then special counsellor to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA), explicated the clear geopolitical implications of Japan’s new message. 
China was at the center of this: “How many states can take Japan’s side if we insist 
on universal values alone? [...] honestly, Central Asian states, Vietnam and 
Myanmar are not generally in favor of universal values” (Interview 2013a). Abe’s 
keynote speech at the premium venue for security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific 
region, the Shangri-La Dialogue, encapsulated Tokyo’s leitmotifs when it stated 
that: “Japan for the rule of law. Asia for the rule of law. And the rule of law for all 
of us. Peace and prosperity in Asia, for evermore” (Abe 2014). But the China–Japan 
finger-pointing that ensued, for the first time in the Dialogue’s history, testified to 
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the hardening of discourses (Inkster 2014). In fact such messages were a clear 
expression of the bilateral standoff unfolding, with them being rooted in the political 
calculations of both states and strongly resonating domestically — thereby 
cementing Japan and China’s self-righteous position. 
China immediately turned up the volume on its rhetorical offensive. It did so by 
instrumentalizing the history issue, specifically to accuse Japan of acting as a 
revisionist country that acted in defiance of the postwar order. In fact, China’s state-
sanctioned narrative enshrined the connection between its territorial claims and its 
victimization at the hands of Imperial Japan for the first time following the 2012 
nationalization of the islands (Drifte 2014; Fravel 2015; Zhang 2014). On September 
10, 2012 China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated that: “Japan’s position 
on the issue of the Diaoyu Island is an outright denial of the outcomes of the victory 
of the World Anti-Fascist War and constitutes a grave challenge to the postwar 
international order” (MFA 2012a). Moreover Beijing reframed the history issue in 
such a way as to reinforce its new-found role as the founder and upholder of the 
international system: present-day Japan was demonized in its guise of challenger to 
international society, just like pre-war Japan had been. These new narratives figured 
in official government pronouncements and state-sanctioned discourses following 
the September 2012 nationalization. Only a couple of weeks later, Foreign Minister 
Yang Jiechi’s address to the 2012 United Nations General Assembly connected 
Japan’s nationalization with the tune already set by the above-cited MFA statement: 
“[The ‘acquisition’] is an outright denial of the outcomes of the victory of the world 
anti-fascist war and poses a grave challenge to the postwar international order” (UN 
2012). The message, one seemingly meant for international consumption, in fact 
mostly targeted domestic audiences and would have dominated China’s narratives of 
Japan. 
The Noda government responded in kind to China’s angered lamentations. It walked 
parallel lines to claim that Japan abided by the UN Charter and called on its 
neighbor to “settle disputes in a peaceful manner based on international law” 
(MOFA 2012). But it was the second Abe administration, which came to power in 
December 2012, that understood the need to match China’s display of nationalistic 
resolve and retaliated with its own communication firepower at the international and 
domestic levels. It did so on the basis of deeply-held beliefs that only a “resolute 
stance” would have tamed an assertive China and that domestic morale needed to be 
on board. Thus, the Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands standoff came to acquire the contours 
of a “game of chicken”: China pressed Japan into recognizing the existence of a 
dispute, while Japan raised its security profile so as to deter China from sending 
vessels and aircraft to the vicinity of the disputed islands. Neither China nor Japan 
capitulated to the opponent’s requests, and played, instead, by the power politics 
book across the security, economic, and communication chessboards. 
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Specific to Japan, these messages had another clear political implication — one 
again rooted in the power politics of the Senkaku/Diaoyu crisis. Abe capitalized on 
foreign endorsements and the Chinese threat to endow Japan with the right to 
collective self-defense and to enhance deterrence against an assertive China. For 
instance, Abe’s July 2015 appearance on primetime television sold his unpopular 
security bills as a means “to shut the doors [of House Japan] from thieves […] so 
that they would neither plan nor continue meddling with our territory […] and they 
would finally resort to international law” (Minna no Nyūsu 2015). By the end of the 
show, Abe had stressed how many foreign states had blessed Japan’s greater 
security responsibility and included explicit reference to the aforementioned 2014 
Shangri-La Security Dialogue as the example of such international support (Minna 
no Nyūsu 2015). These international information wars, defined as government-led 
public diplomacy battles for “soft power,” had a clear domestic angle to reinforce 
the respective bubble of each side’s self-righteousness; in the case of Japan, they 
were also targeted at legitimizing the enhancement of the country’s power projection 
capabilities. 
In other words, China and Japan’s messages bore the hallmarks of government 
propaganda. They were issue-specific, vivid simplifications of a complex reality — 
ones that struck an emotional chord with their respective citizens (Snow 2003: 60-
3). These messages represented “a systematic form of purposeful persuasion that 
attempts to influence emotions, attitudes, and actions of specified audiences for 
ideological, political, or commercial purposes through the controlled transmission of 
one-sided messages (which may or may not be factual) via mass and direct media 
channels” (Nelson 1996: 232). Propaganda is thus concerned with the efficiency of 
its aims, not with truthfulness. Differently from soft power, it engages more 
decisively with message manipulation and negative publicity — rather than playing 
merely on the appeal of one’s own country. Tokyo’s repeated references to the 
contested concept of the international rule of law is a case in point. In the same TV 
debate that Abe participated in, former Defense Minister Morimoto Satoshi — who 
was also a retired defense official — recognized the complexity of the issue: 
China is certainly advancing in the South and East China Seas, but this does not 
mean that China is using military force in the conventional sense […] it certainly 
is using force to change the status quo, as stated by the prime minister, but it is not 
deploying military power in contravention to international law (Minna no Nyūsu 
2015). 
Moreover, China’s claim that Japan altered the status quo by nationalizing the 
islands in contravention to a tacit bilateral agreement to shelve the territorial dispute 
certainly complicated the latter’s identification of Beijing as the revisionist state 
here (Drifte 2013). While it is worth stressing that Japan is ready to bring the case to 
international arbitration if China so wishes, Tokyo willingly simplified the message 
on Chinese coercive behavior in the East China Sea in the courts of foreign and 
domestic public opinion. 
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Thus the logic of the Sino–Japanese discourses was one that toed the line advanced 
by E. H. Carr’s classic study on International Relations: 
The “Jingoes” who sang “We’ve got the ships, we’ve got the men, we’ve got the 
money too” had accurately diagnosed the three essential elements of political 
power: armaments, manpower and economic power. But manpower is not 
reckoned by the mere counting of heads. Power over opinion is […] essential. 
[Because] it was a condition of success [that] the “morale” of one’s own side 
should be maintained, and that of the other side sapped and destroyed. Propaganda 
was the instrument by which both these ends were pursued (2001: 120, 123). 
Propaganda was Beijing’s traditional instrument of choice to win the bilateral 
communication standoff, but it also became the one that Tokyo resorted to as well 
and with vigor. Propaganda ultimately permeated the public discourse of both 
countries, in the process progressively crystallizing into an antagonistic identity on 
each side. 
The power politics of Sino–Japanese antagonistic identities 
The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands standoff: A mirror of the Sino–Japanese 
transition to unbalanced multipolarity 
While scholars have already pointed out the geopolitical and security nexus lying 
behind China and Japan’s chosen diplomatic, military, and economic strategies 
following the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands standoff, this has not been the case for the 
thorny issue of identity. To be sure, recent original scholarship has pointed to the 
spiraling nature of discursive animosity between the Chinese and Japanese 
governments. Nonetheless it has simultaneously failed to recognize the international 
power politics behind this progressive construction of mutually antagonistic 
identities, that is to say the realist underpinnings of discourse making. This is an 
argument worth making by first properly introducing the foundational structural 
realist ontology of this study. 
The leading assumptions are those of structural realist, or neorealist, studies: 
sovereign states are the primary actors in a Hobbesian international system defined 
by the logic of self-help. In the anarchical international system, states aim primarily 
at enhancing the material capabilities essential to national survival, such as industrial 
production, weaponry, conscripts, economic power, and the like. The international 
system is characterized by the distribution of power among its major units, and by 
the number of great powers; however since the international system is more than the 
sum of its constitutive individual states, it exerts pressure over these actors. Such 
pressure ultimately constitutes an incentive toward the maximization of states’ own 
security, hence leading to the recurrence of balancing behavior in international 
politics (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001). At the dawn of the 21st century, Japan 
confronted a multipolar post-Cold War regional order premised not only on China’s 
staggering, if bumpy, ascendance to regional hegemony but also on the relative 
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decline of the United States — whose commitment to its ally’s security cannot be 
taken for granted indefinitely. 
Structural realism has defined Sino–Japanese interactions throughout the modern 
era. The coup de grâce to Qing China’s clout in the Sinocentric order was inflicted 
at the hands of a modernizing Japan that rapidly turned into the regional hegemonic 
power. With regard to China, Peter Hays Gries (2004) and Zheng Wang (2014) have 
both convincingly demonstrated that anti-Japanese nationalism is a structural force 
in China to be reckoned with. Its recurrence is indicative of resentment over China’s 
“Century of Humiliation,” a trauma engraved in the Chinese national psyche and 
historical consciousness. Indeed, the first Sino–Japanese war of 1894–1895 was the 
conflict that de facto allowed Meiji Japan to seize the Diaoyu Islands as terra nullius 
and to rise unrivalled. At the same time, China was carved up through semicolonial, 
unequal treaties and, from the 1930s onward, by Japanese aggression and military 
encroachment. 
One hundred and twenty years or two full sexagenary Chinese cycles later, Japan 
and China traded roles as East Asia’s dominant resident power. China’s growing 
clout and its increased leverage, provided by its might and wealth, has been 
accompanied by an ill-defined “Chinese Dream” premised on louder calls to 
maintain “territorial integrity.” Thus China’s “national rejuvenation” acquired the 
contours of “payback time,” because in the elite’s parlance coming in the wake of 
the 2012 nationalization “Japan stole (qiequ) Diaoyu and its affiliated islands from 
China” during the first Sino–Japanese war (UN 2012). 
In other words, Japan and China’s battle for territory, honor, and status over the 
disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands coincided with the 21st century transition to an 
unbalanced multipolar order in East Asia. Unbalanced multipolarity is defined as a 
regional system that contains a potential hegemon with “so much actual military 
capability and so much potential power that it stands a good chance of dominating 
and controlling all of the other great powers in its region of the world” 
(Mearsheimer 2001: 44–5). According to Mearsheimer, unbalanced multipolarity 
qualifies as the configuration of power that generates the most fear — as evidenced 
by Japan’s growing sense of insecurity. Given the growing power differential 
between China and Japan, the second-most powerful East Asian resident regional 
state, unbalanced multipolarity emboldens China as the potential regional hegemon. 
This has been evident in China’s more frequent, if ambiguous, calls to defend its 
“core interests” (hexin liyi). For these reasons, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands standoff 
has coincided with the broader strategic interaction between the by now greatest 
naval powers in the East and South China Seas: China, Japan, and, most 
importantly, the United States. 
While it is important to understand China’s position, it is also worth noting that 
Beijing had increased its naval presence in the vicinity of the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands already by 2008. Post-Beijing Olympics and post-international financial 
Back to Basics: The Power Politics behind Sino–Japanese Identity Politics 15 
crisis China reflected the growing clout of nationalistic voices from within the 
country’s military apparatus, with emboldened portions of the Chinese policymaking 
elite coming to refer to the disputed islands as “core interests” around the same time. 
Beijing traditionally adopted such a wording to keep third-party actors from 
meddling in Taiwan and Tibet, but it ambiguously expanded its usage to disputed 
islands in the South and East China Seas — respectively by 2010 and 2012. 
Repeated commentary on and testimonies about Chinese claims to the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as core interests in early 2012 indicate that China’s novel 
assertions came prior to Japan’s actual acquisition of these territories (Japan Times 
24 May 2012). 
While it is important to note that the Chinese government had never formally 
sanctioned the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands being part of the country’s core interests, it 
did not deny their inclusion therein either (US–China Economic and Security 
Review Commission 2013). At the same time, and pointing at the aforementioned 
ambiguity, in April 2013 the MFA suggested that the islands were, indeed, a core 
interest, the first time a major government body had hinted at that possibility (MFA 
2013). This statement was later echoed by General Qi Jianguo, deputy chief of the 
Headquarters of the General Staff, who stated in August 2013 that “the Diaoyu 
Islands are within the range of [China’s] core interests” (Fravel 2015: 268). 
Conversely, a stagnating Japan advanced more assertively its maritime interests — 
but doing so in a way reflective of its growing sense of insecurity. Japan expanded 
its scope of action also in light of the limited “window of opportunity” of the early 
21st century, a period of flux wherein US military aegis and power projection was 
still unmatched by China’s own military might. A key foreign policy advisor to 
Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo revealed this logic in a private interview, when he 
incited Fukuda to push China to accept an agreement in principle on the joint 
development of gas fields in the East China Sea because the power balance still 
favored Japan. It would have been impossible to later convince China to agree, 
according to him (Interview 2013b). Four years later, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 
standoff was a clear expression of East Asia’s increasingly unbalanced multipolar 
regional order and Japan strongly felt — and very early in the 21st century at that — 
the regional sands shifting. Japan needed to act quickly too, but the ill-managed 
nationalization provoked China and fueled its forceful reaction, thus inaugurating 
the bilateral power game that has since unfolded. 
Neoclassical realism and the power politics of Sino–Japanese identity 
politics 
Within the broader structural picture of a Japan caught between the Scylla of a rising 
and assertive China and the Charybdis of a declining US (in relative terms), the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute functioned as cognitive transference of the broader 
undercurrents of the transition to an unbalanced multipolar order in East Asia. The 
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same undercurrents of great power politics, reified through the heated standoff, 
impacted also on the reconstruction of the two states’ identities. 
Previous research has employed broad constructivist theories of International 
Relations in order to underline how domestic public discourses since the end of the 
Cold War have increasingly constructed Japan and China’s respective state identities 
in relation to an antagonistic or aberrant counterpart: “Self” and “Other,” or more 
simply “Us” and “Them” (Gustafsson 2015). Scholars have looked at antagonistic 
narratives taken from war memorials, the media, as well as political and public 
debates in both China and Japan, to contend that the sedimentation and active 
reconstruction of such discourses eventually define Tokyo’s foreign policy options 
vis-à-vis Beijing and vice versa (Gustafsson 2011; Hagström and Jerdén 2010; 
Suzuki 2015; Suzuki and Murai 2014; Wirth 2009;). Japan and China scholars have 
prized the ontological centrality of constructivist dynamics in the shaping of each 
state’s identity. With regard to China, Callahan demonstrates how “the identity 
politics of Chinese nationalism produce the security politics of Chinese foreign 
policy” (2010: 13). Here Chinese nationalism is interactive and intersubjective in a 
constant ping-pong between the party-state and deep-layered grassroots nationalism. 
Others have prized either a top-down or, with time, a bottom-up account of Chinese 
nationalism. 
To be sure, China specialists have demonstrated an appreciation for the intricate 
domestic and international politics underpinning China’s instrumentalist identity 
construction vis-à-vis Japan. They have done so by explicitly highlighting the 
formative role of Jiang Zemin in beating the drums of patriotic education around the 
time of the end of the Cold War. Some scholars have traced back the campaign’s 
origins to Jiang’s own personal and familial interaction with the Japanese invaders 
(Wan 2006: 142-5), while others have identified the Chinese Communist Party’s 
(CCP) need to cement its domestic legitimacy in narratives of “victimhood” during 
the Second Sino–Japanese War. In other words, patriotic education was the natural 
corollary of the progressive opening up of the Chinese economy in the 1980s and 
1990s. These reforms opened up the rule of the CCP to questioning, as demonstrated 
by the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989. In order to counter its loss of legitimacy 
in an increasing a-ideological society, the government strategy shifted to fostering 
nationalistic narratives through its propaganda apparatus. These discourses touched 
on China’s righteous place among the great powers, on its multimillenarian 
civilization and Confucian culture, but most importantly on the confrontational 
definition of China against “Others.” In this context, the Chinese movement has 
portrayed Japan as the antagonist and core aggressor during China’s Century of 
Humiliation. 
There are indeed many sources of Chinese nationalism, but the aim of this study is 
in fact broader: turning around Callahan’s (2010) argument to posit instead that the 
security politics of Chinese foreign policy have produced the identity politics of top-
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down Chinese nationalism. Moreover, this study argues that the same has been true 
for Japan, away from constructivist analyses of Japanese identity formation vis-à-vis 
China. The post-2012 antagonistic discourses have, then, abided by a state-centered 
instrumentalist logic that is rooted in power politics. The two governments adhered 
to the neoclassical realist logic expounded by Thomas Christensen, according to 
which state leaders “mobilize their nation’s human and material resources behind 
security policy initiatives” (1996: 11, emphasis added) — as was the case for the 
1947 Truman Doctrine and for Mao’s Great Leap Forward of 1958. From 2012 
onward, Japan and China beat the nationalistic drums to signal more confidently the 
active reclamation or defense of the disputed territories and to show favor for a more 
assertive foreign policy. 
This argument emphasizes instrumentalist uses of nationalistic sources, but does not 
stop at the domestic level of regime security or domestic legitimacy (Edney 2014). 
There is a higher layer of causality in the broader undercurrents of the regional 
power transition to unbalanced multipolarity occurring, ones that have emerged in 
full force following the 2012 nationalization of three of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. 
The key independent variable that sparked the flames of Beijing’s and Tokyo’s top-
down identity politics was that East Asian regional transition to an unbalanced 
multipolar setting; along came with it both Japan and China’s more proactive 
assertion of territorial integrity. In turn, so manifested the threat to homeland 
territories and as an offset to it Tokyo’s and Beijing’s full commitment to 
counterbalancing the opposing state. 
In that spirit, the article moves beyond the parsimonious computation of material 
capabilities provided by orthodox structural realism to take into account the effects 
of a state-led mobilization of human resources for territorial defense. The 
concomitant focus on the domestic dynamics within the state is a hallmark of 
neoclassical realism’s research agenda (Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro 2009). 
Specifically, it details the top-down, state-led mobilization of human resources for 
strategic purposes. This is because both nationalistic governments understood their 
counterpart as being weaker than as met the eye, a typical harbinger of tension 
during turbulent power transitions (Shearman 2013). Thus, the two governments 
drew on propaganda to cement their position over the disputed islands and to 
actively reconstruct the narratives surrounding the counterpart’s actions so as to 
showcase their own domestic resolve. 
Within the crisis scenario, constructivist scholars concerned with identity change in 
Japan’s international relations qualified such particular instances as a window of 
opportunity for (re)creating state identity (Hagström and Gustafsson 2015). Yet, 
they have failed to operationalize the transmission belt between external shocks, or 
critical junctures, and the active re-fabrication of these crises to the governments’ 
own liking. In fact, different from the media and grassroots discourses, the political 
capacity and the pervasiveness of state-sanctioned institutions and information at a 
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time of crisis are unmatched. This is true of authoritarian regimes and democracies 
alike. For instance, studies have found that as much as 80 percent of reporting in 
Western media is dependent on government sources, thanks to governments being 
reciprocally reliant on the media’s capacity to spin and set the agenda, while in 
Japan the figure has gravitated toward a slightly higher percentage than even the 
aforementioned figure (Freeman 2000: 63). 
These scholars have also failed to notice that both Beijing and Tokyo have acted in 
full force through the zero-sum logic embedded in realist thinking within the 
communication landscape. Contrary to recurrent claims that both governments had 
their hands tied, they in fact both tied their own hands with vigor over their self-
righteous position on the islands and in opposition to the counterpart. Evidence 
shows the cross-fertilization between China’s political-economic retaliation against 
Japan and its appreciation for the realist underpinnings of identity politics. 
Immediately after the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands nationalization, Assistant Minister of 
Commerce Jiang Zewei threatened economic retaliation through boycotts — 
garnering strong attention in the process (Reuters 2012). But Assistant Foreign 
Minister Le Yucheng’s address to a symposium on “Uniting and Working Hard to 
Safeguard Sovereignty” was illuminating of the power politics of China’s virulent 
and new rhetorical offensive: 
There is a sinister tendency inside Japan [that aims at] rewriting Japan’s 
inglorious history of illegally stealing Chinese territory. [In the] face of the latest 
developments of the situation surrounding Diaoyu Dao, we should enhance 
confidence. We should note that our motherland is growing more prosperous and 
stronger by the day. China’s international status is rising fast. Gone are the days 
when the Chinese nation was bullied by others at will. We should maintain unity. 
China had untold suffering from the Japanese aggression in modern history, 
because our country was then as disunited as a heap of loose sand (MFA 2012b, 
emphasis added). 
In other words, a victimized China had to mobilize its political, economic, and 
psychological leverage against a revisionist and increasingly assertive Japan. 
Certainly Xi Jinping wore the mantle of nationalism in the face of the CCP elite’s 
exploitation of the upturn in confrontation with Japan, but he was no victim of this 
trend. It became evident that the rhetorical assertiveness and institutionalization of 
China’s sufferings and victory over Japan reached their peak alongside Xi’s 
domestic consolidation of power. In other words, Chinese discourses clearly 
mirrored the administration’s willingness to abandon the cautious foreign policy 
approach taken under Deng Xiaoping’s “keep a low profile and bide one’s time” 
(taoguang yanghui) dictum — being a change in the language register that would 
gradually emerge in the latter Hu Jintao era. The new paramount leader publicly 
sanctioned change on October 24, 2013, during a speech given at an important party 
conference on China’s relations with neighboring powers. Xi stated that Chinese 
diplomacy needed to now “strive for achievements” (fenfa youwei) (Xinhua 2013). 
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Following his speech, the various actors involved in shaping the grand narrative of 
China’s foreign policy came to increasingly adopt the same expression used by Xi 
during the conference in order to highlight the new reality of the country’s “great 
power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics” — doing so over the head of Deng’s 
decades-old pleas for caution. Indeed, tracking the phasing out of Deng’s taoguang 
yanghui strategy from the Chinese public discourse there are a few documents that 
stand out above the white noise of propaganda for their timing and their relevance. 
First is an interview with the influential public intellectual Yan Xuetong that 
appeared a few weeks after Xi’s speech in a publication of the Renmin Ribao 
network as a feature entitled “Yan Xuetong: From Keeping a Low Profile and 
Biding One’s Time to Striving for Achievements” (2013). Second is another speech 
by Xi himself, delivered in November 2014 at the Central Conference on Work 
Relating to Foreign Affairs. Herein he stressed that “China should develop a 
distinctive approach befitting its role of a major country” without mentioning the 
“incriminated” locution (Xinhua wang 2014). Thus China’s more confident, 
assertive behavior coincided with the rise of a new nationalistic administration that 
shared the growing grassroots yearning to secure China’s interests. 
By comparison, Abe’s ascension saw redoubled efforts at identity politics in line 
with his personal ideology and, similarly to China, the concrete need to cement 
Japanese resolve. First-hand evidence corroborates this view, with spectacular 
similarities with the aforementioned Chinese statements. An Abe advisor in charge 
of communication strategies confided to the author that Abe’s speeches at 
international venues aimed to “infuse the Japanese people with confidence [by] 
insisting on discourses on Japan’s freedom and democracy; [such speeches] were 
intended for foreign and domestic audiences [to] flesh out a new type of Japanese, 
who would have provided moral leadership” (Interview 2014). Moreover Abe 
demonstrated an appreciation of a nationalist agenda aimed at the recovery of pride 
and great power status for Japan (Hughes 2015; Pugliese 2014). 
Thus, contrary to constructivist claims, the dynamics that followed in the wake of 
the 2012 nationalization of three of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands have in fact 
highlighted the eminently realist logic underpinning Sino–Japanese identity creation. 
This identity formation has become increasingly rooted in the instrumentalism of the 
power politics of the Sino–Japanese standoff; the latter is, in turn, a reflection of the 
underlying regional unbalanced multipolarity and of its embedded insecurities. Both 
governments have stirred their bureaucratic machines to embark on top-down 
communication efforts. They have beaten the drums of identity politics to cement 
their self-righteousness over the territorial row, to showcase domestic resolve, and to 
intimidate their counterpart. 
Giulio Pugliese 20 
Case studies: China and Japan’s drum beating in 2015, the “Year 
of History” 
It is all the more worrying that the top-down efforts came to abide by a logic of their 
own, one fed by both countries’ respective feeling of insecurity — thus mirroring 
the broader geopolitical insecurities embedded in the regional shift to unbalanced 
multipolarity. Indicative of this logic, the two governments were actually trying to 
mend ties in 2015 — but were seemingly incapacitated also by the very rhetorical 
nationalistic firepower that they had unleashed in previous years. Interestingly, 
Japan and China’s war commemorations became the epitome of their reciprocal 
propaganda wars. An original, narrative appraisal of both events, one that makes use 
of Japanese and Chinese primary sources, provides evidence of the neoclassical 
realist state-led dynamics lying behind discourse making. 
China commemorates the Second World War: The Victory Day parade 
With regard to the 2015 Commemoration of the 70th Anniversary of the Victory 
of the Chinese People’s Resistance] only by showing its military capabilities can 
China show Japan its attitude and determination and let Japan know one thing: 
whoever dares to challenge China’s postwar order and touches China’s core 
interests is China’s enemy, an enemy who must be psychologically prepared for 
China’s strong counterattack (“Zhanhao,” Renmin Ribao Weixin account, January 
26, 2015).1 
China’s grandiose September 3, 2015 celebrations of its victory against Japan 
looked so old, but were — in fact — so new. Only one year before had the National 
People’s Congress (NPC) institutionalized the memorialization of Japan’s surrender, 
and only then did it inaugurate two more state-sanctioned days of national 
mourning: the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Day and, later, Martyrs’ Day. It was also 
the very first time that China commemorated its war against Imperial Japan’s brutal 
aggression through a chest-thumping display of military artillery rather than quieter, 
more solemn celebrations. It was possible that the authorities were merely granting 
the unrestrained expression of China’s deeply-scarred historical consciousness; this 
national psyche was rooted in the state-sanctioned China Dream’s nightmarish 
mirror opposite, its Century of Humiliation at the mercy of Western and Japanese 
imperialism. After all, the Chinese state-led media drew explicit connections 
between past humiliation and future rejuvenation: “Celebrate Martyrs, the National 
Spirit, and the Chinese Dream” (yinglieji minzuhun Zhongguo meng) (Xinhua 
2015a). But the NPC Standing Committee’s reference to the “promotion of 
patriotism as the core of China’s great national spirit” (NPC 2014) as part of the 
                                               
1  Zhanhao is the nom de plume of a popular blogger operating in the People’s Daily’s social network. 
It is likely a pseudonym used by the Chinese propaganda apparatus to convey certain ultra-
nationalistic positions within the Chinese media and blogosphere. Many articles from the state-
sanctioned media have reprised and elaborated on the calls of Zhanhao (Renminwang 27 January 
2015). 
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rationale for establishing Victory Day hinted at the active involvement of the state 
apparatus in the deliberate reawakening of China’s scarred consciousness 70 years 
after the end of the Second World War. 
It was also the first time that foreign militaries had participated in a Chinese military 
parade (China Military Online 2015). Indeed, the angle to that year’s anniversary 
was markedly more international than those of previous commemorations had been: 
it was a feast devoted in equal part to the CCP’s contribution to national liberation 
and also to its righteous cause in the world anti-fascist war. But the CCP’s insistence 
on China’s sacrifice for the last “good” war, as evidenced by Xi Jinping’s speech, 
was less aimed at international recognition than it was at creating a new history for 
domestic audiences (Xinhua 2015b). In this history the CCP is the vanguard fighter 
for, and the guardian of, national liberation, and of the international order born from 
the ashes of the Second World War — a vision carried forth by a deluge of state-
sanctioned movies and dramas that flooded China around the same time. Thus it 
looked like a coming-of-age party for China, where foreign dignitaries — including 
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon — came to appreciate China’s oft-forgotten 
war sacrifices and its role in ushering in the postwar order. At the same time, the 
decision by the Chinese authorities to fill many empty chairs with former Western 
statesmen famous for their lucrative political afterlives, such as former United 
Kingdom Prime Minister Tony Blair and former German Chancellor Gerard 
Schröder, betrayed the role of these “friends” coming from afar. They were part of 
the display and, with a little help from the Central Propaganda Department, they 
helped cater a message to awed Chinese viewers: the world was with China. 
In this context, the Victory Day celebrations were Xi’s biggest political spectacle for 
domestic audiences. At a time of wobbling economic performance, the new CCP 
leadership wore the nationalist mantle to cover over brewing internal (intra-CCP and 
broader domestic) political instability and to reinforce domestic legitimacy. That the 
advent of the Xi Jinping’s administration rule coincided with the heated Sino–
Japanese standoff over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands reinforced scholars and 
practitioners’ suspicion that the CCP had unleashed the anti-Japan tiger so as to 
divert domestic discontent away from the Party. After all, the Bo Xilai imbroglio in 
early 2012 set the score for the turbulent leadership transition that would be staged 
during the 18th Party Congress — while a military parade held only two and a half 
years into Xi’s administration signaled his own impatience. Instead of waiting four 
more years for the canonical military display during the China National Day’s 
decennial, Xi opted for an altogether new and bombastic celebration — one 
accompanied by China’s first general pardon since 1975 (Xinhua 2015c).2 Even the 
State Council Information Office’s exegesis of the event’s complex symbolism 
                                               
2  The international media misrepresented it as a general amnesty, but this was in fact not the case since 
those released retained their status of being convicted criminals. 
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hinted at the CCP’s appropriation of the international message to the end of 
domestic regime stability: 
The doves demonstrate the memory of history and the aspirations for peace, 
representing people from the five continents, who are united and moving together 
toward a beautiful future after going through blood and fire. They also symbolize 
the Chinese people flying into a future of great rejuvenation under the leadership 
of the Communist Party of China (China Daily 2015). 
After all, five in number are the stars depicted in the Chinese national flag, where 
they represent the unity of the Chinese nation under the CCP’s leadership. 
However there was another concomitant cause that prompted the Party’s original 
call for the parade and memorialization. This factor has often remained overlooked 
in international commentary thereon: it was also a display of physical strength and 
psychological unity. The celebrations sent both a domestic and an international 
message of Chinese strength and resolve in the face of foreign encroachment. It was 
a message of deterrence: China displayed 500 units of its latest weaponry, 84 
percent of which were revealed in public for the first time (Erickson 2015). The 
parade’s symbolism also presented a fascinating mix of positive and negative 
feelings that straddled the lines between confidence over China’s victorious war and 
a nagging sense of insecurity, an aspect brilliantly highlighted in William Callahan’s 
(2010) study on Chinese identity politics. For instance the five doves flying over the 
Great Wall-shaped “V for Victory” symbol represented a plea for international 
peace, away from the blood-stained Century of Humiliation. China’s Great Wall was 
the leading symbol of the day, with it also giving shape to the massive audience 
repository built for the occasion around Tiananmen Square. This was the military 
outpost from which Chinese border defenses had sought to force out the Japanese 
invaders in the early 1930s, but it was also an implicit reminder of the need to guard 
against the infiltration of subversive forces and to protect China’s physical and 
cultural security — high-priority missions during the Xi and later Hu Jintao 
administrations (Wong 2012; Osnos 2015). The NPC Standing Committee’s long 
explanation of the rationale behind Victory Day clearly vindicated such views: 
“[The national day] indicates the Chinese position of resolutely safeguarding 
national sovereignty” (NPC 2014). Not by chance, the NPC also promulgated 
Victory Day legislation right at the peak of Sino–Japanese tensions over the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands: in the face of a more ominous regional security 
environment, the Chinese authorities decided to celebrate the Second World War 
decennial with a display of military might. 
The leading foreign recipients of such a display of resolve and military prowess 
were arguably Japan and the US, the principal provider of regional extended 
deterrence. By June 2015 China’s Deputy Foreign Minister Zhang Ming had 
reassured reporters that the celebrations targeted no country specifically, and 
certainly “neither today’s Japan nor the Japanese people in general” (Straits Times 
26 August 2015). Yet only five months earlier popular Renmin Ribao blogger 
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Zhanhao and the many news outlets that carried his analysis had put forward 
different ideas about the parade’s underlying aims. Its main goal was apparently to 
“showcase China’s military strength; to frighten Japan for the sake of maintaining 
the postwar order; to unite the people’s confidence and pride; and, to showcase the 
People’s Liberation Army’s discipline” (Reminwang 27 January 2015). In other 
words, a status quo China still confronted a revisionist and militarist Japan, one that 
was set to change the international order yet again at the dawn of the 21st century. 
This showcase of resolve was matched with action too: China accompanied the 
jingoistic military display with the greatest Russo–Chinese joint naval exercises in 
history, which took place in the Sea of Japan, another first. Concomitantly, it sent — 
again for the first time — five Chinese naval vessels to the Bering Sea off Alaska’s 
coast. Matching words with deeds made sure that the two main recipients firmly got 
the message. 
Finally, on the historically sensitive date of August 15 — when in 1945 the Shōwa 
Emperor had announced Japan’s decision to unconditionally surrender — China 
unveiled the new version of a website devoted to “the historical basis, legal 
documentation, and video data to back the assertion that the Diaoyu Islands have 
been Chinese territory since ancient times” (Diaoyu Dao 2015; Xinhua 2015d). The 
website was launched in additional languages on August 15, 2015, following the 
establishment of the original Chinese version in December 2014 and the Japanese 
version in March 2015. In the words of Zhanhao, Japan better not continue 
“challenging the postwar order” by meddling in the Diaoyu Islands — now often 
included, together with Taiwan and Tibet, as one of China’s core interests. Xi’s 
speech also indirectly targeted present-day Japan when he ended his remembrance 
of Chinese bravery and suffering vis-à-vis Japan with an admonishment: “War is the 
sword of Damocles that still hangs over mankind. We must learn the lessons of 
history and dedicate ourselves to peace” (Xinhua 2015b). China was clearly still 
angry. Furthermore many foreign countries were seemingly with China, with the 
CCP, with Xi Jinping, and against Abe Shinzō’s Japan. In fact Tokyo made its 
“strong displeasure” at the UN Secretary General’s presence at the ceremony 
publicly known; however it perhaps went unnoticed that Xi’s bombastic Victory 
Parade merely mirrored the dynamics and narratives contained in Abe’s own long-
awaited commemorative statement. 
Japan commemorates the Second World War: The Abe statement 
We will engrave in our hearts the past, when Japan ended up becoming a 
challenger to the international order. Upon this reflection, Japan will firmly 
uphold basic values such as freedom, democracy, and human rights as unyielding 
values and, by working hand in hand with countries that share such values, hoist 
the flag of “Proactive Contribution to Peace,” and contribute to the peace and 
prosperity of the world more than ever before (Abe Shinzō concludes his 
government-backed statement, August 14, 2015 — coming on the occasion of the 
70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War). 
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Only three weeks earlier, Tokyo’s commemoration of the end of the Second World 
War had too garnered international attention. On August 14, 2015 conservative Abe 
Shinzō enounced a government-backed statement that was seemingly in line with 
the previous ones given on the 50th and 60th anniversaries thereof. However this 
statement constituted a novelty too. It reflected only briefly and quite ambiguously 
on pre-war Japan’s darker pages to emphasize postwar Japan’s positive role in, and 
its further contribution, to world peace as a status quo country. In fact, in typically 
demure style, the Japanese premier was sending a signal to China and Japan’s 
citizens. 
First, the statement betrayed the prime minister’s aspiration for Japan to outgrow 
what he probably understood as masochistic acts of contrition. Abe was moved by a 
Nietzschean ressentiment for his countrymen’s inability to be fully proud of their 
national history, like any other normal country. It was mandatory to “move on” and 
look to the future, also in response to what he understood as China and South 
Korea’s political use of their “history card.” An early draft of Abe’s initial posturing 
on the Murayama and Kōno Statements (which explicated and apologized for 
Imperial Japan’s war and colonial legacy in East Asia) opens a window onto the 
prime minister’s “future-oriented” thinking: 
Do you follow through (tōshū), or not? Yes or no? Prime ministers of Japan have 
been presented with simple binary options with regard to the Murayama and Kōno 
Statements. But history contains instances of glory and disgrace, instances to 
treasure with pride and instances to treasure as admonition. I can say only one 
thing: Japan intends to build relations with neighboring countries such as South 
Korea and China to share the fruits of prosperity. I am earnestly devoted to the 
future, because the Japan of 30 years from now will bring peace and prosperity 
and I intend to move forward and pursue these objectives with my heart and soul 
(Participatory observation 2012). 
Three years later, Abe’s pledge of looking to the future and his variegated, if 
ambiguous, overview of the past was intact in his statement’s most relevant passage: 
“We must not let our children, grandchildren, and even further generations to come, 
who have nothing to do with that war, be predestined to apologize. Still, even so, we 
Japanese, across generations, must squarely face the history of the past” (Prime 
Minister of Japan and His Cabinet 2015). In the summer of 2015, Abe’s desire to 
move on was on full display. 
While the Abe statement was meant as a message aimed at the world, the 
declaration’s external components were also tailored for domestic audiences. It 
praised the tolerance of postwar China, a country that “paid hatred with virtue,” to 
hint at China’s more recent uncompromising stance over the history issue. In stark 
comparison, Abe acknowledged Western governments’ forgiveness and willingness 
to move forward. This attitude toed the line of Abe’s heavily mediatized state visits 
to Australia and the US, where Tokyo staged highly symbolic instances of historical 
reconciliation with former prisoners of war and war veterans. These messages 
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certainly resonated well with Abe’s insistence on a future-oriented outlook, which 
stressed postwar Japan’s constructive role in international society and its “proactive 
contribution to peace.” However the unspoken aim here was to neutralize Beijing’s 
(and Seoul’s) politically-charged accusations and to showcase to international and 
domestic audiences that the international community was with Abe. This was not 
always the case, though: the US government’s 2013 “disappointment” over Abe’s 
pilgrimage to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine seemed to reflect and prove deeply 
held suspicions about the Japanese premier’s own historical revisionism. 
The thinly veiled negative messages about China’s political use of history are better 
rendered in an illuminating video — “Communication and Reconciliation in the Post 
War Era” — that was produced in mid-2015 by the MOFA, being available both in 
Japanese and in a number of foreign languages. The documentary stressed how 
Australia, the Philippines, the United States and Southeast Asian countries have 
moved past the war’s legacy to the extent that “enemies that have fought each other 
so fiercely have become friends bonded in spirit” (MOFA 2015). In vivid contrast, 
the documentary’s parallel focus on postwar Japan’s economic support to China and 
Korea — the two states that had often lamented Japan’s historical revisionism — 
implicitly stressed Tokyo’s taking the moral high ground. The documentary also 
showed footage of the Japan–China Friendship Hospital, a facility built thanks to 
Japanese Official Development Assistance that Chinese managers decided to rename 
and overhaul in 2015 (Japan News 2015). The Japanese government too was 
capitalizing on foreign governments’ endorsements to reinforce its bubble of self-
righteousness against its Chinese counterpart. 
Finally, the statement superficially echoed, almost verbatim, the Chinese 
government’s politically charged calls for Japan to “squarely face the history of the 
past.” But it did so with an implicit, if also recurrent, desire to highlight the identity 
chasm between a virtuous postwar Japan that forcefully upheld the international 
order against an aberrant wartime doppelgänger that sounded like present-day 
China. Abe’s introspection on the “mistaken road to war” taken in the 1930s 
sounded very much like a warning to Beijing, not least because of the added 
emphasis in the original text: “Japan gradually transformed into a challenger to the 
new international order that the international community sought to establish” (Prime 
Minister of Japan and His Cabinet 2015). If there ever was a doubt about the identity 
of this aleatory challenger, the conclusions (reported in the incipit of this section) 
reached certainly dispelled it. 
The intriguing mix of soothing words and thinly veiled antagonistic discourses 
confirmed that Abe and the Japanese government’s resolute stance was an 
unwavering one. Japan too was displaying a message of physical strength and 
psychological unity here, one rooted in power politics: under the banner of a 
“proactive contribution to peace” Japan and fellow democracies would balance 
China’s assertiveness. Given Beijing’s persistent refusal to go before international 
Giulio Pugliese 26 
arbitration on its territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas, it was China 
that had started to look like a challenger to the established international system. In 
short, China’s challenge to Japan’s effective control over the disputed 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands met with an unwavering display of resolve from Tokyo: an 
autocratic China had better stop challenging the international status quo, because a 
democratic Japan was angry — and the “free world” was with Japan, and against a 
revisionist China. It is all the more fascinating to notice the parallel qualities to 
Chinese and Japanese narratives here. 
Critics may counter that these narratives are mere objective representations of Japan. 
However Abe’s insistence on the primacy of universal values, democracy, the rule 
of law, and freedom of navigation came despite these not typically being associated 
with Japan’s traditionally pragmatic approach to foreign policy. Nor did these values 
match the Japanese premier’s own conservative political philosophy, according to 
which individual rights rest on the primacy of a strong nation-state that is capable of 
safeguarding them. In fact, 20 years earlier Abe’s mentor in foreign and security 
policy summarized the endurance of Japan’s geopolitical imperatives when 
answering a question posed by an American journalist: “The histories of our two 
countries are different. Your country was built on principles. Japan was built on an 
archipelago” (Okazaki 1993: 61). Geopolitical imperatives and a heated crisis 
cajoled the active reconstruction of Chinese and Japanese identities and discourses 
centered on the past. The mirror-like quality to China’s and Japan’s barrage of 
antagonism alienated, in turn, the counterpart even further. It was the age of great 
power identity politics. 
Conclusion 
The broader geostrategic environment of Sino–Japanese great power politics has 
unleashed Beijing and Tokyo’s active manipulation of antagonistic discourses vis-à-
vis the counterpart. More broadly, the insecurity embedded in the shifting sands of 
an increasingly unbalanced multipolar order in East Asia has been the underlying 
incentive behind Sino–Japanese rivalry, an assertive foreign policy on both sides 
(but especially China’s), and security and identity politics’ renaissance. As both 
governments raised the stakes on the security and economic chessboards, the heated 
standoff immediately spilt over onto the communication one as well. Certainly for 
China, behind the issue of Japan looms even larger its American adversary — whose 
position can be weakened by attacking Japan and positioning China as the better 
guarantor of the post-war world order as compared to the US and Japan. At the same 
time, while the China Dream narratives hint at China’s insistence on a mirror-like 
negative imagining of the US (Callahan 2015) the sheer outright negative quality to 
messages put forward regarding Japan confirms that country as in fact China’s most 
demonized “Other.” 
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This article has highlighted the centrality of governmental and political actors — 
such as the Abe and Xi administrations, which seem prone to leaving an indelible 
footprint on the history of both polities — as “identity entrepreneurs” involved in 
reconstructing Japan’s “Self” and the Chinese “Other,” and vice versa. While some 
scholars have pointed to the importance of the identity politics lying behind Sino–
Japanese hostilities, they have altogether failed to notice the formative role therein 
of power politics — and the active involvement of political actors in discourse 
making for clear instrumental purposes, namely being aimed at building up national 
resolve. 
It is all the more worrying, however, that the Sino–Japanese, state-led identity 
politics abided by an action–reaction logic of an arms race. In fact, these propaganda 
efforts became increasingly driven by international imperatives; they were bilateral 
in scope; they were intense in their rapidity and expression; they were associated 
with ongoing high political tension; and, they were operationally specific, indicating 
high strategic stakes in the eyes of policymakers in both states (Till 2012: 18–9). As 
shown elsewhere, the flaring up of the Japan–China battle for the sympathies of 
informed public opinion in turn cemented in place novel domestic institutions — 
ones that echoed the chorus of voices coming from within the government and 
media organs lamenting the counterpart’s behavior. While the Chinese state 
propaganda apparatus is by now well known, the Japanese polity gradually saw the 
creation of a more unfamiliar “government-institutional-media complex” 
preoccupied with China’s assertiveness (Pugliese 2015). Meanwhile the Chinese 
government’s decision in early 2014 to institutionalize and memorialize the 
anniversaries of its victory against Japan and the Nanjing Massacre constituted two 
important novel domestic institutions, ones that will further engrave anti-Japanese 
sentiment into the Chinese national psyche. While Xi Jinping was the first Chinese 
president to publicly commemorate the tragic and brutal massacre at the hands of the 
Japanese occupiers in Nanjing, he toned down criticism in 2014 and he decided 
altogether to skip these remembrance in 2015. Yet, the institution is now in place 
and was concomitant to China’s quest for recognition of the massacre in the 
Memory of the World UNESCO list. Its inclusion in 2015 prompted an angry 
reaction from the Japanese government, which threatened to cut down Japanese 
funding to the UN agency (Japan Times 2015; Guardian 2015). 
In fact, in 2014 China pursued a tactical detente with Japan in the East China Sea 
and pulled out an oil rig from the waters of the South China Sea — which Vietnam 
claims as its Exclusive Economic Zone. Thus Xi Jinping has agreed to meet Prime 
Minister Abe, and made some gestures toward reopening the frozen official dialogue 
channels at the ministerial level. The Xi administration did so to temporarily 
appease Abe’s powerful and economically appealing Japan, while going “all in” 
with the construction of artificial islands on disputed reefs within the Spratly 
Islands. As the US somewhat showcases its own resolve against Chinese 
assertiveness there, Japan has been also signaling greater interest in the proactive 
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preservation of regional stability. The practice of power politics is slowly being 
routinized in Sino–Japanese relations, pointing ultimately at the perseverance of 
underlying antagonistic identity politics therein. 
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